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Abstract. Crucial for action coordination of cooperating agents, joint
attention concerns the alignment of attention to a target as a conse-
quence of attending to each other’s attentional states. We describe a for-
mal model which specifies the conditions and cognitive processes leading
to the establishment of joint attention. This model provides a theoret-
ical framework for cooperative interaction with a virtual human and is
specified in an extended belief-desire-intention modal logic. keywordsco-
operative agents, attention, alignment, BDI, modal logic
1 Introduction
A foundational skill in human social interaction, joint attention is receiving in-
creased interest in human-agent interaction. Attention has been characterized
as an increased awareness [1] and intentionally directed perception [2] and is
judged to be crucial for goal-directed behavior. Joint attention can be defined
as simultaneously allocating attention to a target as a consequence of attending
to each other’s attentional states [3]. In contrast to joint perception (the state
in which interactants are just perceiving the same object without further con-
straints concerning their mental states), the intentional aspect of joint attention
has been stressed, in that interlocutors have to deliberatively focus on the same
target while being mutually aware of sharing their focus of attention [2] [4].
The computational modeling of joint attention mechanisms or prerequisites
thereof, such as perceptional attention focus, convincing gaze behavior, gaze
following skills, has been addressed in cognitive robotics, e.g. [3] [5], and research
on virtual humans and embodied conversational agents, e.g. [6] [7]. However,
aspects of intentionality and explicit representation of the other’s mental state
are not accounted for in these approaches altogether.
In this paper, we address the cognitive challenges of joint attention in action
coordination of cooperating agents [8]. According to Pickering and Garrod [9]
successful communication is based on joint processes, called alignment, which
realize action coordination between interlocutors without an explicit exchange
of information states. In previous work we have argued [10] that one central con-
dition of such alignment processes consists of joint attention and that activation
of a dynamic working memory and a partner model are crucial constituents.
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We investigate joint attention in a cooperative interaction scenario with the
virtual human Max, where the human interlocutor meets the agent face-to-face
in 3D virtual reality. The human’s body and gaze are picked up by infrared
cameras and an eye-tracker [11]; e.g., Max can follow the human’s gaze. The
agent’s mental state is modeled in the BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) paradigm.
In order to establish joint attention, the interlocutors need to be aware of each
other’s current epistemic activities. The human interlocutor’s focus of attention
is inferred from her overt behaviors, and focused objects are activated as salient
in the agent’s dynamic working memory; for detail cf. [10].
In this paper we describe a formal model which specifies the conditions and
cognitive processes leading to the establishment of joint attention. This model
provides a theoretical framework for a cooperative interaction scenario with the
virtual human Max and the CASEC cognitive architecture introduced in [10].
In Section 2, we firstly introduce the use of activation values in modal logic and
derive a definition of attention in Section 3. In Section 4, a formal definition of
joint attention with regard to the required mental states is presented. In Section
5, we formally examine the action chain and skills involved bringing about the
mental states requisite for joint attention. Section 6 presents a conclusion.
2 Formal Specification
To establish joint attention an agent must employ coordination mechanisms of
understanding and directing the intentions underlying the interlocutor’s atten-
tional behavior, cf. [10]: The agent needs to (r1) track the attentional behavior
of the other by gaze monitoring and (r2) derive candidate objects the interlocu-
tor may be focusing on. Further, the agent has to (r3) infer whether attentional
direction cues of the interlocutor are uttered intentionally. The agent has to (r4)
react instantly, as simultaneity is crucial in joint attention and in response should
(r5) use an adequate overt behavior which can be observed by its interlocutor.
Important in our approach is a dynamic working memory, which is inspired
by Oberauer [12] who conceptualizes working memory in three successive levels
characterized by increased accessibility for cognitive processes: (1) The activated
part of long-term memory pre-selecting information over brief periods of time; (2)
the region of direct access keeping a limited number of representational ”chunks”
available for ongoing cognitive processes; (3) the focus of attention holding the
particular chunk selected for the immediate cognitive operation to be applied.
2.1 Beliefs
Our CASEC architecture (Cognitive Architecture for a Situated Embodied Co-
operator) [10] adopts the BDI paradigm of rational agents [13] applying modal
logic as a specification language, but additionally integrates a dynamic working
memory. The formalism used to specify goals and beliefs builds on the possible
worlds approach. We use a (doxastic) modal logic KD45 for modeling beliefs.
In accordance with [13], we use the three modal connectives BEL, GOAL, and
INTEND as atomic modalities.
Definition 1. Any first-order formula is a state formula. If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are state
formulae then also ¬ϕ1 and ϕ1∨ϕ2. If ϕ is a formula then BEL(ϕ), GOAL(ϕ),
and INTEND(ϕ) are state formulae [13]. If i is an agent, then (BELi ϕ) is an
abbreviation denoting that agent i believes formula ϕ [14].
Hereafter ”formula” is to mean ”state formula”. To account for the dynamics
of agent i’s beliefs, we extend the formalism to include activation values (for
further motivation cf. Section 3).
Definition 2. If (BELi ϕ) is a formula, then also (BELi ϕ a), a ∈ <+ is a
formula. Acti(BELi ϕ a) = a returns the formula’s current activation value a.
Also terms are extended to contain an activation value:
Definition 3. For a given formula ϕ with n terms, let t set(ϕ) denote the set
of terms of ϕ, t set(ϕ) := {ei|ei term of ϕ, i = 1, ..., n}. Each term ei with term
value ‖ei‖ is augmented by an activation value a. Therefore we define ê to consist
of: ê := (‖e‖, a), a ∈ <+. The function Acti(ê) = a returns the term’s current
activation value.
Activiation values influence the beliefs’ accessibility for mental operations. They
are calculated by an ACT-R-like function for modelling recency effects and decay.
Additionally, automatic activation impulses of different origins with own decay
rates are included to model the overall saliency of a belief.
The activation value of a formula ϕ consists of the average of the contained
terms’ activations, #ei denoting the number of terms (i=1,...,n):
Acti(ϕ) =
∑ Acti(êi)
#ei
, ei ∈ t set(ϕ) (1)
The set of current beliefs is defined as follows:
Definition 4. Let Beliefsi denote the entire set of agent i’s beliefs. Then we
define curBelsi := {bk|bk ∈ Beliefsi ∧Acti(bk) > θBELacti, k = 1, ..., n}
θBELacti represents a threshold which is dynamically tuned so that only a lim-
ited number of items reside in the set of curBelsi modeling the region of direct
access of Oberauer’s working memory model (see Section 1). Figure 1 illustrates
the extension of the classical set of beliefs to a dynamic model including acti-
vation values. Activation values can be seen as adding an additional dimension
which allows for filtering mechanisms. Thus we model ”increased awareness” by
use of activation values for aligning a candidate set of mental operations to the
current context as well as to the interaction partner.
In addition to the modal connectives introduced above, we follow [15] in
adding HAPPENS and DONE to the atomic modalities. If α is an action then
(HAPPENS α) states that action α will happen next and (DONE α) means
that action α has happened. These basic temporal operators are augmented by
the operator ”;” responsible for describing event sequences e.g. (α;β) denotes
that first action α and then action β is executed. Additionally, <> denotes the
modal operator possibly and [ ] the modal operator always [14].
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Fig. 1. Extending beliefs to dynamic beliefs with activation values
2.2 Goals - Intentions - Plans
Like [16] we see intentions as not reducible to beliefs and goals but as primitive
modal connectives. However, they can be decomposed as follows (the modal
operators PLAN, COMMIT are not formally introduced here).
Definition 5. An intention is decomposed into the respective goal, the adopted
plan and the commitment to use this plan as a means to achieve the goal:
(INTENDi ϕ) ::= (GOALi ϕ) ∧ (PLANi ϕ)
∧ (COMMITi((GOALi ϕ), (PLANi ϕ)))
Whereas commitment is not directly relevant for the focus of attention, the
parameters of the goal and the plan formulae directly apply to it. To cover the
object related aspects of the formulae the function t set (see Def. 3) is applied.
Definition 6. The termsets of the modal connectives dissolve to the termset of
the respective formula involved: t set(GOALi ϕ) := t set(ϕ), t set(PLANi ϕ) :=
t set(ϕ). The termset of an intention derives from the termset of the current goal:
t set(INTENDi ϕ) := t set(CurrentGoali(INTENDi ϕ)).
The CurrentGoal is the highest activated goal of the set of goals associated with
the current intention. This set of goals consists of the intention’s goal specifica-
tion and the subgoals invoked in executing the adopted plan.
3 Defining the Focus of Attention
Like beliefs, also intentions and plans are qualified by activation values. We use
activation values as a measure for saliency, i.e. an object with a higher activation
value is more salient than one with a lower one. Whenever an object gets in
the agent’s gaze focus or is subject to internal processing, activation values are
increased. That is, the set of curBelsi models the region of direct access proposed
by Oberauer [12]. Depending on the processing step a new derived belief, a
chosen intention, or an executed action of a plan corresponds to the focus of
attention. We define the current belief and intention by use of activation values.
The current plan step corresponds to the action of the currently adopted plan,
an acyclic graph of nested goals covering the actions to be executed next:
Definition 7.
curBELi := {bx|bx ∈ curBelsi ∧ ∀b ∈ curBelsi ∧ b 6= bx : Acti(bx) > Acti(b)}
curINT i := {nx|nx ∈ Intsi ∧ ∀n ∈ Intsi ∧ n 6= nx : Acti(nx) > Acti(n)}
curPLAN STEP i := {actionx|(COMMITi(GOALi ϕ), curPLAN i ϕ)
∧ actionx ∈ Acy graph(curPLAN i ϕ)) ∧ (HAPPENSi actionx)}
As these processes of perception and cognition run concurrently, we conjoin all
three aspects in our concept of focus of attention.
Definition 8.
ATTi := {t set(curBELi) ∪ t set(curINT i) ∪ t set(curPLAN STEP i)}
The focus of attention is part of dynamic working memory and is modulated by
the changing beliefs and intentional states of the agent. Figure 2 illustrates the
classical BDI model extended by the incorporation of activation values.
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Fig. 2. BDI and Focus of Attention
4 A Definition of Joint Attention
In accordance with [2] we conceive of joint attention as an intentional process.
Meeting the requirements of Sec. 2, we describe the mental state required for an
agent i to believe in joint attention while focusing conjointly with its interlocutor
j on a certain target ϑ (see Figure 3 for illustration and explanation next page).
Definition 9. (BELi(JOINT ATT i j ϑ)) iff
1. (being aware of other)BELi(ATTj ϑ) ∧BELi(INTENDj(ATTj ϑ))
2. (ascribing goal) BELi(GOALj(ATTi ϑ ∧ATTj ϑ))
3. (adopting goal) GOALi(ATTi ϑ ∧ATTj ϑ)
4. (feedback) BELi(BELj(ATTi j))
5. (focus state) HAPPENS(< T (ϑ) >i ∧ < P (< T (ϑ) >j) >i)
(1) (being aware of other) By representing the explicit belief about the inter-
locutor’s focus of attention BELi(ATTj ϑ) the agent meets requirement (r1). To
meet (r3) the agent additionally needs to infer whether the interlocutor inten-
tionally draws its focus of attention on the object, BELi(INTENDj(ATTj ϑ)).
(2) (ascribing goal) Agent i must believe that agent j has the goal that both
agents draw their attention focus to the target BELi(GOALj(ATTiϑ∧ATTjϑ)).
This belief can be evoked by an initiate-act of agent j e.g. by gaze-alternation.
(3) (adopting goal) The agent then needs to adopt the interlocutor’s goal
GOALi(ATTi ϑ ∧ATTj ϑ). To meet requirements (r4) and (r5), the agent as a
recipient needs to employ an observable respond-act.
(4) (feedback) But for mutual belief, an additional respond-act is required from
the initiator j so that agent i comes to believe BELi(BELj(ATTi j)).
(5) (focus state) When agent i draws its focus of attention on the target
(< T (ϑ) >i) while perceiving that its interlocutor also focuses on the target
(< P (< T (ϑ) >j) >i), then from agent i’s perspective a joint attention state has
been established. For definition of T (test-if ) and P (perceive-that) see Sec. 5.
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Fig. 3. Joint attention from agent i’s perspective
5 Grounding Modal Connectives in a Logic of Action
After defining the mental state required for joint attention, we need to specify
the epistemic actions that lead to the respective beliefs and goals. To this end,
a logic of action is required. Like [14] we adopt standard propositional dynamic
logic. In this logic, epistemic actions of perceptual kind are applicable to all
formulae (propositions and actions) but do not allow direct perception of mental
states. However an agent can perceive overt actions of its interlocutor as well as
propositions of objects. We adopt the definition of two epistemic actions of [14]:
– Perceive-that : Action of perceiving some ϑ in the external world.
< P (ϑ) >j ϕ (always ϕ is true after agent j has perceived ϑ)
– Test-if : (precursor of Perceive-that) Test-if actions observable and testable
from other agents as they are expected to have an observable counterpart.
By default we assume that, whenever an agent perceives something, it believes
what it has perceived: [P (ϑ)]i → (BELiϑ). As time constraints and coordination
are crucial in joint attention, a representation of time is needed.
Definition 10. For α being an action expression, Begin(α) := time tbegin at
which execution of α starts, End(α) := time tend at which execution of α ends.
The duration resolves to Dur(α) := End(α)−Begin(α). We write (α)j[tbegin,tend]
to describe the points in time of agent j’s action α beginning and ending.
Test-action While an agent’s test-if actions are observable [14], additional in-
formation is required to resolve the target. We use the dynamic working memory
as a source of background information marking relevant objects and a partner
model to account for the interlocutor’s perspective. The candidate set of target
objects are the objects in the interlocutor’s line of gaze. Incorporating activation
values in the reference resolution allows a fast and easy adjustment of the can-
didate set (meeting requirement (r2)). If the agent perceives the interlocutor’s
behavior as a test-action and is able to resolve a candidate object, the agent
infers that the interlocutor’s focus of attention must reside on that object.
< P (< T (ϕ) >j) >i → (BELi(ATTj ϕ)) (2)
Beliefs about the interlocutor’s focus of attention are updated dynamically, lead-
ing to new beliefs or increasing a belief’s activation respectively. If the interlocu-
tor focuses several times on an object (or for a long duration) the agent interprets
this as the attention focus being intentionally drawn upon the target (cp. [10]):
< P (< T (ϕ) >j) >i;< P (< T (ϕ) >j) >i→ (BELi(INTENDj(ATTj ϕ)))(3)
Initiate-actions One way to perform an initiate-act consists of gaze alterna-
tion. An object has to be the focus of attention for several times with additional
short glances addressing the interlocutor inbetween (triadic relation).
< P (< T (ϕ) >j) >i ; < P (< T (i) >j) >i ; < P (< T (ϕ) >j) >i ;
< P (< T (i) >j) >i → (BELi(GOALj(ATTi ϕ)) ∧ (ATTj ϕ)) (4)
Respond-actions Respond-actions play a crucial role to backup the actions
the agents have sought to perform. They can consist of smiling at, focussing on,
and nodding to the interlocutor. The respond-actions can be applied to establish
mutual understanding between the interlocutors. E.g. after agent i performed a
respond-act, it checks whether agent j has noticed its response:
(DONE(< T (j) >i)[tend] ∧ (HAPPENS < P (< T (i) >j) >i)[tbegin] ∧
(Dur(< T (j) >i ≥ 2s)) ∧ ((tbegin − tend) ≤ 5s)→ BELi(BELj(ATTi j)) (5)
(Heuristics: Empirical research, not quoted here, has shown that the recipient’s
response to an agent initiating joint attention needs to take place in a 5s time
frame, with a signal duration of more than 2s.)
6 Conclusion
We presented work on equipping a cooperative agent with capabilities of joint
attention. To this end, a formal definition of joint attention has been introduced.
The required initiate- and respond-acts have been specified and grounded in a
logic of action. The formalizations provide a precise means as to which require-
ments need to be met and which inferences need to be drawn to establish joint
attention by aligning the mental states of cooperating agents. Implemented in
the CASEC cognitive architecture [10] for our virtual human Max, they form
the basis for the study of joint attention in a cooperative interaction scenario.
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